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Introduction
This paper is planned to be part of a larger project in progress 
[1]. The larger project deals with the practice of religious freedom 
in countries representing distinct constitutional models of state-
church relations from both a normative/theoretical and also an 
empirical perspective. The normative part of the project will examine 
the characteristics of liberal versus illiberal constitutionalism, with a 
special focus on different models of state-religion relationships, while 
the empirical part will compare different national constitutional 
regulations on religious rights to identify how much religious freedom 
is provided in the different countries belonging to distinct models 
of state-church relationship. To highlight the theoretical challenges 
through concrete cases three countries: Egypt (a country that between 
2011 and 2013 started to build up a democratic system with and illiberal 
theocratic constitutionalism); Hungary (which became a liberal 
democracy after 1989-90, but since 2010 has been backsliding into an 
illiberal constitutional system, while still having a liberal separationist 
approach in its constitution); and Israel (a liberal democracy without a 
constitution, with a very special accommodations model). In the cases 
presented it will be clear that the political aspirations for more illiberal 
constitutionalism appear to be the decisive element in finding similarly 
restrictive measures for freedom of religion. The project will conclude 
that the different constitutional models of state-religion relationships 
alone do not indicate the very status of religious rights in a polity. 
In this paper the question of how the State of Israel deals with 
legal pluralism of different religious groups regarding status rights 
was addressed. Law and religion are two competing cultural systems 
that constitute individual and collective identities, as well as social 
interaction [2]. In the history of Israel, a religiously as well as ethnically 
deeply divided society, various individual and collective religious and 
national identities have developed. These issues are reflected in the 
constitutional regulations, as well as in the different legal systems of the 
country, existing parallel to each other [3]. 
The normative starting point of Judaism has been a collective 
conception of subjectivity, in opposition to Western Christianity’s 
emphasis on individual choice and belief. The Jewish Enlightenment 
(Haskalah) of the last two decades of the 18th century and in the 19th 
century encouraged adoption of secular European culture, and has 
started a ‘Kulturkampf’ between secular and religious Jews. Haskalah 
challenged the rabbinical leadership, opposed the limitation of Judaism 
to the dimensions of Halakhic religion, and aspired to improve the 
lives of Jews by striving for their integration into Western culture [4]. 
Zionism, as a national movement of the Jews, claimed that Jews represent 
a common and single people, and that the only way to establish a 
nation, which could live freely as Jews was to the dwell in a Jewish state. 
Contrary to the European and Jewish proponents of emancipation in 
the 19th century, who treated their case as a religious issue, to request 
freedom of religion for a religious minority, Zionism was a new, 
national approach of the Jewish question. Besides responding to the 
distressing condition of the Jewish existence in Eastern and Central 
Europe Zionists also reacted to this ‘schism’ with divided approaches: 
Ahad Ha-Am aimed at transforming Jewish religion into a national 
culture; liberal Zionists, like Theodor Herzl and Ze’ev (Vladimir) 
Jabotinsky opted for the European culture; religious Zionists preferred 
a Halakhic approach, and Micha Yosef Berdyczewski a Hebrew cultural 
approach. Parallel with this development, the legal system during 
the British Mandate (1918-1948) underwent an intensive process of 
Anglicization and liberalization due to the extensive borrowing from 
English law.
The establishment of the State of Israel as a nation-state in 1948 
required the revision and renewal of Judaism generally and of Jewish 
legal and moral discourse (Halakha) in particular [5]. Judaism in the 
late 19th century, when Zionism was born, was a religion in exile, and 
an insistence on waiting for the Messiah. Hence a yearning for return 
to the long-lost homeland, as well as the rabbinic ban on ‘forcing the 
end’ support the political culture of passivity played an important role 
in Judaism. And since Zionism’s centrally important goal was negation 
of the exile and passivity, Zionists were hostile to Judaism, and they 
did not accept rabbinical authority [6]. This overwhelmingly secular 
character of the Zionist project, which never denied however that 
Jews became a nation through their religion, was also the reason, why 
Judaism has never been proclaimed the official religion of the state, 
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Abstract
In the first chapter the historical relationship of Judaism and Zionism was discussed, while the second discusses the 
constitutional conflict between Jewish and the democratic character of the State of Israel. The third chapter analyzes 
the millet system of religious laws (inherited from the Ottoman Empire) for both Jews, as the religious majority, and 
for different minorities. The main question is, whether or not this pluralist legal system can be considered as liberal, 
providing equal rights, and what other alternatives are feasible in Israel today. The more general constitutional question 
behind the legal one is, whether or not the Jewish and the democratic character of the State of Israel based on Zionism 
can be consolidated. 
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and Jewish law has never been proclaimed the applicable legal system, 
except in certain matters of the personal status of Jews. Herzl made it 
clear in many of his writings that the Jewish state won’t be a theocracy, 
even though church and state won’t be separated institutionally from 
each other either [7]. Religious freedom and pluralism is reflected in 
the 1948 Declaration on the “Establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-
Israel, to be known as the State of Israel”: “[The State] will guarantee 
freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it 
will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions.” These provisions are 
provided by the legislative text enacted in 1922 at the time of the British 
Mandate, which is still in force in the State of Israel: „full liberty of 
conscience, and the free exercise of their forms of worship subject only 
to the maintenance of public order and morals” for „all persons in 
Palestine [8]”. 
Since later the two Basic Laws with quasi constitutional status failed 
to explicitely mention freedom of religion, the Israeli Supreme Court 
read freedom of religion into the term ’dignity’ which is protected by 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty [9]. Altough the exact content 
of freedom of religion is unclear, most agree that it has a negative and 
a positive aspect: freedom of religion (a version of the free exercise 
clause), and freedom from religion (a version of the disestablishment 
clause, without having a general prohibition on establishing religion) 
[10]. In the case Shavit v. the Chevra Kadisha (Burial Society) of Rishon 
Le Zion, the Court overruled the decision of a local rabbi in charge of 
the cemetery. He refused a family request to have the deceased’s name 
inscribed on the tombstone in both Hebrew and Latin characters, Chief 
Justice Aharon Barak argued: “...the value (and liberty) of freedom of 
religion...is in my view, simply an aspect of Human Dignity...to my 
mind, freedom from religion equally constitutes an aspect of Human 
Dignity...it is not possible to conclude that in a clash between freedom 
of religion and freedom from religion, one or the other always has the 
upper hand [11].” 
With the establishment of a new Jewish State secular modern 
nationalism with Western liberal values gained precedence over 
traditional religion in Judaism. Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, 
distanced himself from the theological underpinnings of the Jewish 
tradition, and saw Zionism as giving birth to a newer and improved 
Judaism. This Judaism was cultural and not religious, modern and not 
traditional, and it was built upon a secularized return to the Bible and 
rejection of the rabbinic tradition. As Ben-Gurion himself put it: “I am 
not religious, nor were the majority of the early builders of modern 
Israel were believers. Yet their passion for this land stemmed from the 
Book of Books… though I reject theology, the single most important 
book in my life is the Bible [12].” When Ben-Gurion agreed to allow 
the religious establishment in mandate Palestine to continue to have 
jurisdiction over matters of personal law (including marriage, burial, 
and conversion) he did so in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
Jewish nation-state in the eyes of its Jewish citizens and of diaspora 
Jews, and also to preserve Jewish unity. For this he needed the support 
of Orthodox religious factions, mainly that of the National Religious 
Party [13]. In making what is known as the ‘status quo’ agreement, he 
assumed that Jewish religiosity would dwindle after the founding of 
the state [14]. In the long run he was an advocate of the separation of 
state and religion, and that, in the meanwhile, the state would be able 
to control religion. 
Indeed, the 1940s and 1950s were seen by many as a transition from 
Hebrew to Jewish culture, and religiosity was seen as an anachronistic 
remnant. In the beginning of this period the dominant labor movement 
could be characterized as close to Socialism and collective values, over 
time the party has changed, favoring a neoliberal belief in capitalism 
and endorsing individualism [15]. Religion ceased to be the primary 
measure of Jewish identity; as religious separatism and practice began 
retreat, a secular version of Zionism was actively promoted, and 
now, seculars have been ruling the country for decades. In addition, 
antireligious sentiment had become widespread in left-leaning Israeli 
circles of the 1960s [16]. 
At the same time with the 1977 election victory of the Likud a radical 
change was occurring in the collective identity of the State. Michael 
Walzer calls this development the ‘paradox’ of secular liberation 
movements being taken over by religious forces [6]. The crisis of Jewish 
secularity, modernity and liberalism of the previous three decades 
caused the rise of religious fundamentalism within religious Zionist 
groups, but especially within ultra-Orthodoxy. Religious Zionists do 
not claim that the secular Zionists are wrong to see Israel as a Jewish 
State. They are in agreement that the establishment of a Jewish State 
created a new and different reality for Jews and Judaism. Conversely, 
since for the ultra-Orthodox Jews the notion that Israel is a Jewish State 
violates the basic religious tenets of the Jewish tradition, they reject 
the claim that Israel can be a Jewish state at all. While the religious 
Zionists treated religion as the exclusive source of normative authority, 
the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox group stood up against both modernism 
and Zionism, the Sephardic Shas party pursued the return to Judaism 
and introducing a Halakhic theocratic state, and the National Religious 
Party stated that one of the party’s goal is “to promote original 
legislation, based on Torah law and Jewish tradition [17]”.
During these radical changes in party politics, the Supreme Court 
of the country started a very activist jurisprudence in order to defend 
the secular liberal values of the pre-1977 period. Due to this activism 
of the Court, especially in its capacity as High Court of Israel dealing 
with citizens’ petitions without concrete personal interest against 
administrative authorities, Jewish law has been little felt in Israeli 
secular liberal law. 
The Foundations of the Law Act, 1980 was enacted in order to 
disconnect the reliance upon English common law in cases of lacuna 
within the Israeli legislation. It was instrumental for the jurisprudence 
of the court. According to the act: “Where the court, faced with a legal 
question requiring decision, finds no answer to it in statutory law or 
case law or by analogy, it shall decide the issue in light of principles 
of freedom, justice, equity and peace of the Jewish heritage [18].” The 
purpose of this law, as Justice Elon wrote in the case of Jereczewski v. 
Prime Minister, is “cultural and nationalistic. Its aims are to create a link 
between the law of the Jewish State and the legal heritage of the Jewish 
people, throughout its generations and diasporas, and to implement 
the principles of justice, equity, freedom and peace that Jews have 
fostered throughout the generations and that have been expressed in 
the rich literature of the Jewish heritage in every generation [19].” 
Even the most symbolic expression of the state’s new identity, the 
two Basic Laws of 1992 on Human Dignity and Liberty and on Freedom 
of Occupation respectively declaring the State of Israel as a ‘Jewish 
and democratic state’, has got alternative interpretations. Courts and 
scholars are divided over whether the term ‘Jewish’ should be read as 
referring to Judaism as a religion, to Jewish nationality, or to Jewish 
morality. Although the majority of views are that this ‘constitutional’ 
provision does not mandate the state to become a theocracy, because it 
is certainly excluded by the democratic character, but rather mandates 
to ‘integrate’ or ‘harmonize’ the two poles. This phrase leaves ample 
room for competing interpretations [20]. 
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Aharon Barak, the Court’s Chief Justice for twelve years, and the 
person most closely identified with the Court’s liberal jurisprudence 
proposed two concepts as defining the ‘Jewish state’: a) a ‘national 
concept’ of the State of Israel as a ‘national home to the Jewish 
people’, and b) as values derived from the Halakha (which in Barak’s 
interpretation intends to prevent the direct application of the Halakha 
as part of Israeli law). In other words, Barak suggested that a national, 
secular concept, should dominate a strictly religious one. In opposition 
to Barak’s approach, Justice Elon included Jewish religion in the term 
‘Jewish’, and argued that following the enactment of the Basic Laws, 
applying Jewish law became a legal duty incumbent on every judge in 
the country [21]. Elon also claimed that, since the term ‘Jewish state’ 
is mentioned first in the phrase, this is superior to that of developing 
the country’s law as democratic law [22]. In Barak’s view the ‘Jewish 
state’ and ‘democratic state’ concept should be approached on equal 
terms at peace with each other without raising any contradictions: “An 
appropriate analysis does not have to intensify these contradictions. 
On the contrary, in a purposeful analysis, based on constitutional 
unity and normativity, harmony, aspires to find that which is unifying 
and common, while preventing contradictions and reducing points 
of friction. We must strive to find the common denominator and 
synthesis between the values of Israel as a Jewish state and the values 
of Israel as a democratic state [23].” Barak also emphasizes the fact 
that most of the population of Israel is secular and that some of its 
citizens are not Jewish. Regarding the democratic character of the 
state Barak indicates that it establishes provisions for both majority 
rule and the preservation of human rights: “The values of the state 
of Israel are the same values that are being reflected on a given time 
the premise of modern democracy. This democracy is based mainly 
on two foundations: the first is the government of the people. A 
democratic regime is one where the people determine their destiny. 
The people choose their representatives and the latter determine the 
result on a majority vote. The second foundation is human rights. A 
democratic regime is one that holds and develops human rights. Only 
the combination of both tiers can lead to a true democracy [24].” Once 
one of these tiers is removed from the equation, it is analogous to losing 
its essence [25]. 
But besides the interpretations of Barak and Elon, emphasizing the 
national, Zionist character and the Halakha-values on the one hand, 
and Judaism based on the Halakhic commandments on the other, there 
are other possible interpretations of the ‘Jewish state’ concept. One of 
them excludes the Arab, the other the mostly overlapping Muslim, part 
of the population. In other words, the ‘Jewishness’ of the State means 
that while the Jewish people are entitled to use the state as a means 
of exercising their right to national self-determination, the Arabs are 
entitled to their rights on an individual basis only, i.e., as citizens of 
the state, but not in any way as a collective entity. This is generally true 
today, even though the Arab citizens currently enjoy some rights that 
are of collective nature: a) Under Article 82 of the Palestine Order-
in-Council, 1922, which is part of Israeli law, Arabic is an ‘official 
language’, b) the Arabs run a separate educational system, c) Israel 
preserves the millet system, which allows its Arab citizens (as well as 
its Jewish citizens) autonomy in the sphere of family law, which means 
that under Israeli law it is religious law that governs the family sphere, 
and religious courts have jurisdiction [26], d) in certain areas there 
exist an affirmative action doctrine in favor of Arab citizens, e) under 
Israeli law the Arabs are entitled to maintain their religious sabbaticals 
and holidays. But more importantly, Israeli law prohibits Israel’s Arab 
citizens from taking action aimed at changing Israel’s current identity 
as the Jewish people’s nation-state. For instance Section 7a(a)(1) of 
the Basic Law provides that no party will be allowed to participate in 
elections to the Knesset if its platform or actions amount to the ‘denial 
of Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state’. Also Section 5 
of the Parties Law of 1992 provides that no party will be registered 
if its goals and actions amount to the ‘denial of Israel’s existence as 
a Jewish and democratic state’. Section 134(c) of the Knesset Bylaws 
provides that the Knesset speaker will not approve the submission of 
any draft legislation, which ‘denies the existence of the State of Israel as 
the Jewish people’s state’. 
This concept of limited collective rights for Palestinian Arabs is 
based on Jabotinsky’s policy regarding the Arab question: to erect an 
‘iron wall’ of Jewish military force. For the leader of Revisionist Zionism 
the iron wall was a means to the end of breaking Arab resistance after 
1936 to help the onward march of Zionism. Once Arab resistance had 
been broken there would be time to offer the Palestinians civil and 
certain collective rights. This was the very reason that Albert Einstein 
in the early days, before Israel existed, was opposed to the idea of the 
Jewish state. He thought that “the first and most important necessity is 
the creation of a modus vivendi with the Arab people”. After the State 
of Israel was established, Einstein gave his full support, but he said that 
a peaceful and permanent presence of Jews in Palestine could only be 
possible if they worked side by side with Arabs under the conditions of 
social and political equality [27]. Actually there were some moments of 
hopes for this equality. David Ben-Gurion speaking in late 1947, after 
the United Nation’s vote for partition, to a meeting of Mapai said the 
followings: “In our state there will be non-Jews as well, and all of them 
will be equal citizens... we are obliged to do… full and real equality, 
de jure and de facto, of all the state’s citizens, gradual equalization 
of the economic, social, and cultural standards of living of the Arab 
community with the Jewish community, recognition of the Arab 
language as the language of the Arab citizens in the administration, 
courts of justice, and above all, in schools; municipal autonomy in 
villages and cities, and so on [28]. ” But later, in a private conversation 
with Arab intellectual, Ibrahim Shabath he also emphasized that “you 
must know that Israel is the country of the Jews and only of the Jews. 
Every Arab who lives here has the same rights as any minority citizen 
in any country of the world, but he must admit the fact that he lives in 
a Jewish country [29].” 
In other words, as Avi Shlaim convincingly proves in his book, it was 
the Labor Zionists, led by the same David Ben-Gurion, who gradually 
came around to Jabotinsky’s point of view that Jewish military power 
was the key factor in the struggle for a state, none of the government over 
which Ben-Gurion presided lived up to the commitments he described 
[30], and have turned more than ever nationalistic [31]. Michael Walzer 
argues that the crucial reason for this was the invasion of the new state 
in 1948 by five Arab armies [6]. But as we also know that in April 
1948 Israeli terrorist bands attacked the Arab village of Deir Yassin, 
which was not a military objective in the fighting, and killed most of its 
inhabitants, 240 men, women and children, and in July that same year 
the Israeli army attacked the Palestinian village of Lydda killing more 
than 200 residents, and deporting the survivals upon Ben-Gurion’s 
instruction. Altogether 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from their 
homes, and several thousand of them were shot and killed when they 
tried to sneak back home [32]. This ethnic ‘cleansing’ was an integral 
part of the Zionist mission to create a state with the largest possible 
Jewish majority [33]. In a later book, Avi Shlaim calls the aftermath of 
the 1967 War when Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the 
Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, Zionism’s transformation from 
a legitimate movement of national self-determination to an ideology 
tightly entwined with a colonial occupation, in which the equality Ben-
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Gurion promised has never been realized [34].
Constitutionalism and State-Religion Relationship 
In trying to place Israel within the models of state-religion 
relationship in liberal democracies all around the world, we can use Ran 
Hirschl’s book, in which he differentiates extant models of state and 
religion relations. He puts Israel into the category, where the general 
law is secular, but a degree of jurisdictional autonomy is granted to 
religious communities, primarily in matters of personal status and 
education, religious jurisdictional enclaves [35]. Israel’s government 
involvement in religion is low for the Middle East/North Africa 
(MENA) region, but is relatively high in world context [36]. As Hirschl 
argues, the state in such setting has embedded interest in preserving 
or promoting a viable ’state religion’ to the extent that this religion 
provides meaning to the national metanarratives that constitutes the 
nation as such.
The State of Israel was originally a nationalist state for the Jewish 
people. However, there are authors who claim that the Israeli state 
sponsors a particular communitarianism founded on a particular 
kind of vision for Jewish statehood. That statehood’s mission would 
promote Jewish culture embodied in the norms governing symbols 
and language, the Law of Return benefitting diaspora Jews, vesting 
some state functions in religious courts, and the absence of civil 
marriage. While the Israeli polity protects individual rights such as 
religious freedom, it also subordinates those rights to Jewish unity. This 
legitimates restrictions on Anti-Jewish speech or action, and therefore, 
communitarian priorities may ‘suppress the liberal inclinations of its 
citizens [37]’. The original 1950 Law of Return, stated that “Every Jew 
has the right to come to this country as an oleh” without defining who 
counted as a Jew. Ben-Gurion’s government maintained that Jewish 
status was a matter of self-determination. But after more and more 
immigrants to Israel (especially from Poland and Russia) were deemed 
not Jewish by birth, the Law of return was amended in 1970 to define 
who was a Jew: “anyone born of a Jewish mother or who converted” 
[38]. Currently there are also demands to make citizenship for the Arab 
minority less inclusive, and even to amend the Law of Return so as 
to give Orthodox rabbis the authority to determine whom the state of 
Israel recognizes as a Jew. 
In addition to the nationalistic, communitarian, and therefore 
illiberal character of the state there were growing demands for it to be a 
religious state as well. This is especially true over the last three decades, 
when there has been a continuous decline in the political power and 
representation of Israel’s historically hegemonic and largely secular 
Ashkenazi constituencies. At the same time, political forces representing 
Orthodox religious Mizrahi residents have grown stronger. As Hanna 
Lerner argues the paradigm of liberal constitutionalism is not a relevant 
framework for such religiously divided societies, such as Israel. She 
claims that under conditions of disagreement over the state’s religious 
character, the drafters of constitutional design in different countries 
have adopted either a permissive or a restrictive constitutional approach 
to address their intense internal religious conflicts. The permissive 
constitutional approach of Israel uses strategies of constitutional 
ambiguity, ambivalence, and vagueness to allow the political system 
greater flexibility in future decision-making regarding controversial 
religious issues. By contrast, a restrictive constitutional approach, such 
as the one chosen in Turkey, uses specific constitutional constrains, 
designed to limit the range of possibilities available to future decision 
makers, when addressing religion-state relations. Permissive 
constitutions, she argues, for the most part allowed for greater freedom 
of religion, especially guaranteeing the survival of minority religious 
groups, than did restrictive constitutions. By contrast, freedom from 
religion, namely the right of individuals to opt out of a religious 
affiliation, is limited under permissive constitutional arrangements, 
such as Israel, compared with the restrictive constitutions of other 
states [39]. Religious groups enjoy complete autonomy under Israeli 
law, while in Turkey respect for religious expression in the public 
sphere is limited. For example, Muslim women are prohibited from 
wearing headscarves in public institutions, including universities and 
public schools. By contrast, in Israel, religious marriage and divorce 
are the only options for all citizens, including nonbelievers and atheists. 
This means that the right to marry is violated for hundreds of thousands 
of citizens, including interreligious couples or the four percent of the 
population who are not affiliated with any religion.
The Jewish state came into being on 14 May, by way of the 1948 
Declaration of Independence. It is mainly a political document, which 
tried to distinguish between legislative and constitutive powers by 
creating a Provisional State Council and a Constituent Assembly. 
There were and are still several arguments against the enactment of a 
written Constitution [40]. One of the fiercest opponents of the project 
of drafting a constitution was David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime 
Minister. One of the major obstructions in adopting a Constitution 
comes from orthodox and secularist circles taking a decisive position 
on the unresolved questions of the relationship between religion and 
state, and the national and cultural or religious nature of the declared 
Jewishness of the state. In other words, the main reason of uncertainty 
was the profound ideological rift in Israeli society between the secular 
and the religious vision of the state. But there were other reasons as 
well: Ben-Gurion wanted the least restrictions on his power; most of 
Jews were abroad and it seemed unfair to entrench a constitution by a 
minority; the British experience was also an argument against adopting 
a constitution, and religious people objected because for them there 
was already a constitution-the Bible. The American founders of the 
American constitution needed a written document to affirm their 
existence as a nation, while founders of the new State of Israel were still 
struggling over the very definition of nationhood [41]. In this context 
some political-legal issues have arisen, such as the question ‘who is a 
Jew?’, which is particularly relevant in matters of marriage and divorce. 
Further problems have arisen under the Law of Return and the rights 
to automatic citizenship for Jewish immigrants, which does not permit 
Arabs to reunite with their families who live in the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip or elsewhere. These problems are also related to the fundamental 
characteristic of the Jewish law that there is no distinction between law 
and equity, between legal and ethical norms [42]. The position of the 
religious representatives was that a Jewish state should have Jewish 
laws. For instance, the Orthodox Agudat Israel Party demanded that 
the legal system be based on the Halackha (Jewish religious law), and 
opposed the constitution with the following argument: „There is no 
place in Israel for any constitution created by man. If it contradicts 
the Torah – it is inadmissible, and if it is concurrent with he Torah – 
it is redundant.” Ben-Gurion, and his governing Labor (Mapai) Party 
vehemently objected to the aspiration for establishing a ’theocratic 
state’, holding that the success of the Zionist project required fostering 
a new Jewish identity – Israeli. Conversely, orthodox representatives 
feared that a constitution would entrench secular principles, leading 
to a Kulturkampf. 
Since both the secular and the religious parties opposed the 
constitution for different reasons, and despite the large majority of 
the secular camp (only sixteen out of the 120 members represented 
the religious parties), in June 1950 the Knesset decided not to draft a 
Citation: Halmai G (2016) Constitutionalism, Law and Religion in Israel a State’s Multiple Identities. J Civil Legal Sci 5: 169. doi:10.4172/2169-
0170.1000169
Page 5 of 11
Volume 5 • Issue 1 • 1000169J Civil Legal Sci
ISSN: 2169-0170 JCLS, an open access journal
constitution in a single document. Following a heated debate on the 
religious and secular vision of Israel as a Jewish state, a compromised 
resolution was passed, named after its sponsor, Haim Harrari, the chair 
of the Knesset Committe: Basic Laws, as chapters together, will form 
the state constitution [43]. 
In the absence of a written constitution as a single document, the 
competing religious and secular claims have been dealt with through 
a series of informal convocational arrangements [44], known as ’the 
religious status quo’ which over time became entrenched in the political 
landscape. These arrangements, as a compromise between religious and 
secular leaders, still effectively determine the non-separation between 
religion and state in certain areas. Various aspects were formally 
defined through legislation: the recognition of the Sabbath as the day of 
rest [45], the prohibition of public transportation on the Sabbath [46], 
traffic and road control during the Sabbath [47], the flag and emblems 
expressing Jewish tradition, kosher food in state institutions, and in 
the army, and most importantly, the institutionalization of a pluralist 
personal law system (following the millet system): an independent 
Orthodox educational system with the autonomy for religious schools, 
the transfer of state money to religous schools (Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim), exemptions from military service for ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) 
yeshiva students [48] and religious women, and state appointed and 
funded clergy and religious services. But the most infamous example 
of Israeli enmeshing of religion and state is the exclusive Orthodox 
jurisdiction over Jewish marriage and divorce, in other words the 
lack of civil marriage and divorce. In contrast to the relative ease with 
which the first nine Basic Laws that were passed after 1958, mainly 
dealing with institutional considerations, and were (in essence the legal 
formalization of the existing structure of government), the religious 
parties objected to the draft of the Basic Law on Human and Civil 
Rights, proposed in 1989, because they claimed it would undermine the 
religious status quo. The religious laws are one of the reasons why the 
Basic Law on Human Dignity contains an explicit provision (Article 
10), which protects the validity of laws which were enacted before it 
coming into force. Indeed, the new Basic Laws of the early 1990s, which 
changed the previous constitutional culture of legislative sovereignty 
following the British constitutional tradition [49], made it possible 
to challenge in court some basic tenets of the status quo expressed in 
legislation. The activist stand of the Supreme Court of Israel made the 
status quo in many religious-related issues impossible, but the growing 
involvement of the Supreme Court in status-quo related issues should 
be assessed within the context of the intensifying activities of the 
Likud-led legislature and government in shifting the balance of the 
status quo in responding to demands of the religious parties [50-58]. 
For instance, an amendment to the State Education Law that secures 
public funding for religious schools, even if they do not meet the 
standard of basic curriculum as stated by the original State Education 
Law of 1953. This amendment of 2007 created a new phenomenon 
of autonomous education not meeting state standards being subsidized 
by the government. This happened despite the fact that even the original 
status quo document from 1947 stated, with regards to the independence 
of the religious Ultra-Orthodox education, that: “The state, of course, will 
determine the minimum of compulsory studies…history, science, etc., and 
will supervise the fulfilment of this minimum [50].”
The Supreme Court favored secular positions and Western liberal 
values, while some circles that are totally opposed to a Constitution 
(such as the Haredi parties, together with some advocates of a 
Constitution [51] support a separate Constitutional Court [20]. 
The highly activist doctrine of the Israeli Supreme Court adopted 
in the 1980s was a consequence of the decline of the political, social 
and cultural hegemony of the Labor movement and the renewal of 
religious fundamentalism in the second half of the 1970s, and the Likud 
victory in the 1997 elections. The group of former governing forces – 
identified with Western, secular liberal values – lost much power in 
Israeli politics and culture and found itself facing an alternative cultural 
option for the country, premised on the Halakha and traditional Jewish 
heritage. These liberals shifted much of their political action to the 
Supreme Court, which collaborated with them. Justice Aharon Barak, 
the Court’s Chief Justice for twelve years, and the person most closely 
identified with the Court’s activism, represented the view that any court 
of law should have competence to legally review any legal norm that 
regulated human conducts. Barak, who called the enactment of the two 
Basic Laws on human rights as a ’constitutional revolution’, provided 
the following interpretation of section 2 of the Basic Law on Freedom 
of Occupation on ’Israel as Jewish and democratic state’: „The meaning 
of the Jewish nature of the state is not in the religious-Halachic sense, 
and hence the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish State should not be 
identified with the Jewish Law” [52]. This led to mass demonstrations 
in Israel against Barak and his Court. In a decision from February 2002 
the Court, for the first time, granted formal recognition to Reform and 
Conservative conversions performed in Israel, which reignited the 
debate over the issue of ’Who Is a Jew?’ [53] Critics consider this as 
a sort of legal fundamentalism and over-legalization, which has made 
the High Court of Justice in the eyes of religious groups a partisan 
institution [54].
The debate over the meaning and interpretation of what many 
consider a self-contradictory definition continues to divide Israeli 
society. In recent years the Israeli Palestinian minority demanded 
the transformation of the state from its definition as ’Jewish and 
democratic’ to a ’liberal democratic’ state in which the Paletinians 
would be recognized as a national minority. Until 1966 Israeli Arabs 
were under military rule, since the abolition of this they have enjoyed 
formal civic and political rights, but they were consistently excluded 
from Israeli nationhood, which had always been understood in terms of 
Jewish identity, and therefore their citizenship was always constrained. 
(The Law of Return grants only Jews the right to immigrate to Israel and 
settle there.) The Arab population is excluded from military service, 
which is obligatory for all Jewish citizens. 
By contrast there are constant efforts by Jewish nationalists to 
propose a new Basic Law, which would define Israel as the nation-
state of the Jewish people. In 2011 Avi Dichter, member of the Kadima 
party, together with another 39 Knesset members submitted such a bill. 
They did this in order to prevent Israel from becoming a binational 
state. The bill said that the right to self-determination would be unique 
to the Jewish people, that the Hebrew language would be considered 
the only official language, that the Hebrew calander would become the 
official calander of the state of Israel, and that Hebrew law would serve 
as an inspiration to Israeli legislators [55]. After Kadima chair women 
and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni publicly announced her opposition 
to the bill, Dichter withdrew the draft, and in its place proposed a 
more moderate one, which still defined Israel as the state of the Jewish 
nation, described Arabic as ’a language of the state’ rather than an 
official language. Since the opposition Labor Party and members of 
the governing coalition came out against the draft, it has not passed a 
preliminary reading. 
Then, in the Spring of 2014, two right-wing Knesset members 
submitted the newest version of the bill, which although has been 
stripped of some of its controversial clauses, still establishes Israel’s 
status as ’the nation-state of the Jewish people’, declares that the Jewish 
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people have the exclusive right to national self-determination, and 
calls the ’land of Israel’ the historic homeland of Jewish nation and 
none other. This time Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, following 
a Palestinian refusal in peace talks to recognize the status of Israel, 
endorsed the draft with the argument that the state of Israel as the 
nation state of the Jewish people is not sufficiently expressed in the 
basic laws. Justice Minister Livni has expressed her opposition, again, 
to ’any law that gives superiority’ to the Jewish nature of the state over 
the country’s democratic values. In the Fall of 2014 Prime Minister 
Netanyahu announced support for an even more extreme version of a 
Jewish Nation State bill sponsored by coalition whip Zeev Elkin (Likud). 
This was done to protest the lack of progress by a panel established by 
Netanyahu and Livni for the purpose of hammering out a compromise 
version of the bill. The new draft specifies that Jewish law is to be a 
source and ’inspiration’ for new legislation and judicial rulings. The bill 
also states that holy places must be protected from „anything that could 
harm the freedom of access by religions to the places that are sacred 
to them or to their sentiments towards those places” (which could 
support claims that Jewish people should be allowed to pray on the 
Temple Mount). Justice Minister Tzipi Livni refused to bring the bill 
to vote in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation. She read a quote 
from Likud ideological forebear Ze’ev Jabotinsky to remind the Likud 
what he stood for: ”I do not think that a state’s constitution should 
include special articles explicitly ensuring the national character. A 
sign of a good constitution is if few such articles are found in it.” As a 
response, Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman said that „Jewish values 
come before democratic values if and when there is a clash between 
them.” Another coalition partner of Likud, Economy Minister Naftali 
Bennett, warned with a potential break of the coalition, argued that 
if there is no law ’establishing Israel as a Jewish state, the High Court 
will try to appy the Law on Return to non-Jews and act like it there 
was never a law stating otherwise.” As a result, on November 23rd 
the Cabinet of Israel approved the draft legislation with 14 votes to 6, 
and could now proceed to the Israeli parliament for a first reading. On 
December 2, 2014 Prime Minister Netanyahu fired Justice Minister 
Livni and Finance Minister Lapid, and called for new elections. 
Critics argue that the proposal is not intended to reflect the status 
quo, but to alter it in a fundamental way curtailing the democratic 
character of the state and to reduce Israeli democracy to a ’democratic 
regime’ [56]. The proposal does not promise full and equal rights to the 
minorities in Israel, as individuals and as collective, this is especially 
worrisome because the existing constitutional basis for the protection 
of individual and collective rights is weak, and some basic rights are not 
explicitly mentioned, including equality, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of religion. 
As demonstrated, the State of Israel, self-defined either as Jewish 
and democratic or only as Jewish, does not treat all its citizens 
equally. This stems largely from the fact that religion is an inseparable 
part of its Jewish identity. The proposed changes would remove the 
sovereignty from the citizens, and shift it to all Jews, many of whom 
are not citizens of Israel (citizenship would become empty of meaning 
because it becomes exclusive to one ethnic group, and would give a 
privilege that is not part of the democratic way. In a seminal decision 
of the Israeli Supreme Court from 1970, regarding how to register 
children of a mother who was not Jewish, one of the justices, though 
in the minority, wrote: „Jewish nationalism cannot be detached from 
its religious foundations.” Jewish identity seems to defeat ’Israeliness’ 
as a collective identity, and Judaism appears more and more to serve 
as extremely strong ’social glue’ in Israel today. The process in which 
there is a strengthening of religious elements in society is called 
’religionization’ [57]. That Jewish Israelis’ changed attitudes toward 
religion is proved by public opinion surveys, which show, not only that 
religious groups are increasing in number, while the secular groups are 
shrinking, and the secular sector is no longer a majority, but a strong 
correlation between Israeli-Jewish self-definition along the religiousity 
continuum and the respondents’ perception of the relative importance 
of Halakha compared to democratic principles [58]. 44 percent of them 
see a contradiction between them, which means that Israeli democracy 
is highly likely to be in the position of losing its foothold [59].
The political background behind this phenomena is certainly the 
decay of the political left and the rise of the nationalist right, which have 
created a comfortable setting in which religious power can flourish. 
This meant the collapse of secular, liberal Zionist hegemony, and a rise 
of an Orthodox Jewish approach. Another interpretation of the same 
development is that we are witnessing the birth of a new, religious form 
of Zionism. Certainly Zionism has moved a long way from the ideology 
of its ’founding fathers’, and it has pressed territorial claims, religious 
exclusivity, and political extremism [60]. This clearly due in part to the 
failure of political leaders to reach a two-state territorial solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That failure has led to a post-territorial 
nationalism, basing itself in a collective Israeli identity firmly rooted in 
religion [61]. In other words, religion plays a legitimating role in efforts 
by the current political leadership of Israel, to keep the status quo of a 
one-state solution on the basis of one nation [62]. 
Non-liberal Pluralist Legal System
Two additional developments in the legal system have taken place 
since the 1990s: a) religious Zionist jurists have established a system 
of arbitration tribunals aimed at resolving civil disputes according 
to the Halakha, in competition with the state’s secular court system; 
and b) there have been calls for officially granting the Rabbinical 
Courts, which apply the Halakha, the power to serve as arbitrators in 
civil disputes [54]. These efforts were rejected by the decision of the 
High Court of Justice (HCJ) in the Sima Amir case, in May 2006. The 
majority of the HCJ decreed that the official (or ‘State’) rabbinical court 
must not litigate in areas that do not concern marriage and divorce, 
and therefore has no authority to engage in arbitration at all, and that 
whenever it engages in arbitration it oversteps its authority. This means 
that the Halakhic status of the official rabbinical court is greatly affected 
by its status under Israeli law [63].
In certain areas of the legal system there is no uniform law, but 
various judicial enclaves exist dealing with divisive issues: a) each 
religious group applies its own religious law of marriage and divorce; 
b) there is also no uniform law to govern the observance of the Jewish 
Sabbath and other religious holidays; c) the growing of pigs and the sale 
of pork is subject to different norms in different settlements [64]; and 
d) there are different regulations for religious and secular cemeteries. In 
some cases decentralization is an appropriate means to solve religious, 
cultural disagreements, but in others, like in the case of matrimonial 
laws, probably not when it prevents mixed marriages between Jews and 
non-Jews serves religiously and ethnically discriminative interests of 
the state [65]. When introducing the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction 
(Marriage and Divorce) Law in 1953 the Deputy Minister for Religious 
Affairs explained that one of the purposes of granting legal recognition 
exclusively to religious marriages was to exclude the possibility 
of mixed marriages that might result in the conversion of Jews to 
other faiths [66]. Similarly, when it became known that the Muslim 
Shari’a Courts in Israel were willing to marry Muslim men to Jewish 
women, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has instructed the Shari’a 
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Courts to refrain from conducting such marriages [67]. Non-religious 
Jews resent the exclusive authority of the religious institutions and 
consider it a case of religious coercion. Non-believers and members 
of an unrecognized religious group are disadvantaged in matters of 
personal status, since there are no lay officials authorized to celebrate 
and register marriages, there is no secular law on marriages, and civil 
courts have no jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce [68]. 
Gila Stopler argues that these restrictive Israeli rules of marriage and 
divorce serve two functions: a) the unity function unites the Jews of 
Israel under a unitary national identity, and b) the gatekeeping function 
demarcates the boundaries of the Jewish nation along religious lines 
[66]. This ‘thick establishment’ of the Jewish religion in Israel violates 
the freedom of conscience and belief of all those who do not wish to 
marry in Jewish Orthodox religious ceremony, including non-religious 
Jews and religious Jews following a different stream of Judaism, (for 
example Reform and Conservative Judaism). It also violates the rights 
to equal treatment of all non-Jews, who wish to marry Jews. 
Halakhic marriage and divorce law
As mentioned, marriage and divorce law in Israel is subject to the 
authority of religious courts and Halakhic law in a way that prevents 
many Israelis from exercising their right to marry and divorce. Since 
civil marriage and civil divorce do not exist, persons who desire to 
marry or divorce are obliged to do so in a religious ceremony supported 
by the prevailing state law, even if they hold no religious beliefs [69]. 
According to the legal situation only Orthodox rabbis of the local 
rabbinate of the Jewish couple’s place(s) of residence or that of their 
wedding are allowed to conduct such ceremonies. This clearly violates 
religious pluralism even of the Jews of other denominations, such as 
the Conservative and Reform. 
The control of Orthodox Judaism over marriages of Jews in Israel 
is also preventing marriages of other Jews a vast majority of those 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants of Jewish descent the state has 
brought from the former Soviet Union to Israel under the Israeli Law 
of Return for the explicit purpose of strengthening the Jewish majority 
in the country. Due to the discrepancy between the definition of a Jew 
under the Law of Return and the definition of a Jews under Orthodox 
religious law these marriages are prevented within the borders of Israel 
[70]. 
In October, 2013, the Knesset enacted an amendment to the 
Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance, which provided that the 
couple may register for marriage with any rabbi authorized to register 
marriage in Israel, “regardless of the [couple’s] place of residence 
or the location of their marriage”. Ori Aronson, whose description 
of the amendament I rely on here calls the new system as mimetic 
pluralism, a design of a public institution that respect, and reflects 
existing variations in belief systems, which as a bottom-up project 
of institutional design is thought of as a passive-responsive political 
strategy [71]. The formal justification for the amendment focused 
on the fact of young person’s geographic mobility in contemporary 
Israel, which renders the requirement of local registration needlessly 
burdensome. In fact, representatives of secular constituents unable 
to muster the political force to enact a comprehensive civil marriage 
reform, instead recurrently opted for a second-best solution, having 
in mind that a local rabbinate might not be as strict as the one they 
might have been bound to under the previous place-of-residence-based 
option. As Aronson claims, a modern-Orthodox registrar might treat 
couples differently than his ultra-Orthodox counterpart, and a rabbi 
in an urban setting might have different understandings of family and 
community than a rabbi in a small town or rural context. In other 
words the amendment allowed couples to ‘shop’ for a more hospitable 
rabbi-registrar from among those available in the existing distribution 
of local rabbinates throughout Israel [72]. 
But despite this rather cosmetic change, especially those who are 
not permitted to marry under Halakha (such as couples of different 
religions; persons having no recognized religious affiliation; persons 
ineligible to marry, for instance a ‘cohen’ a member of the priestly class; 
and same-sex couples) are still facing serious challenges. These couples 
according to the Israeli legal system, have no ‘official’ possibility of 
marriyng each other. Furthermore, the Halakhic laws (as well as the 
shari’a) are gender based and hierarchical [73]. The Jewish wedding 
ceremony places the man in the active role of endower and buyer, and 
the woman in the passive role of receiver and the one being bought [74]. 
When a married woman has sexual relations with a man other than her 
husband, Jewish law considers it a serious violation, which has grave 
economic consequences and a child born out of wedlock to a woman 
who is still married to another man carries the mark of a ‘mamzer’ 
(bastards). By contrast, Halakhic sanctions against a man, who set up 
a new family without being divorced, are much more moderate. His 
children out of wedlock are not considered ‘mamzerim’. The grounds 
for divorce are not the same for men and women. While a woman’s 
infidelity is considered absolute grounds for divorce, a man’s infidelity 
is not generally recognized as grounds for divorce. The divorce law 
restricts the freedom of exit from the spousal relationship, particularly 
for the so-called ‘chained’ women, who fail to prove their husband’s 
faults, and who also fail to obtain the husband’s consent, the ‘get’ (also 
spelled as ‘gett’, agenot), and therefore cannot remarry and remain 
chained. Although the rabbinical courts have the authority to achieve 
a religious ‘get’, in practice they very rarely do that [75]. Conversely in 
some cases, the Halakha grants a man, whose wife has refused him a 
divorce, permission to marry another woman. 
As a replacement for civil marriage and divorce, Israeli secular 
law has developed some secular alternatives; the two most important 
of them being living together without marriage, and civil marriage 
abroad [76]. The institution for couples who maintain a marriage-
like relationship but are not considered married by law is called 
cohabitation. These couples must prove in detail that their way of life 
suits the requirements of the law. On the other hand the dissolution of 
a cohabitation relationship does not require an official process, which 
weakens the legal defense enjoyed by such a relationship. Hence this 
institution does not provide an adequate substitute for their inability to 
marry in a civil ceremony. According to recent case law the registration 
official must record as married the persons who were married in a 
civil marriage abroad, based on the marriage certificate presented by 
persons who cannot marry in Israel, such as same-sex partners, mixed 
couples. But since Israeli law has not given final and official recognition 
to the validity of civil marriage outside of Israel, despite its registration 
in the population registry, the option of a civil marriage abroad cannot 
be a satisfactory substitute to the civil marriage either. The Civil Union 
for Persons of no Religion Act passed by the Knesset in 2010 represents 
the third alternative to religious marriage, but this option enables only 
couples who do not belong to any recognized religion to establish a 
marital relationship, hence this law did not solve the problems of 
others who are prohibited from marrying under Jewish law, such as 
couples of different faith, same sex couples, women without the ‘get’ of 
their husband, or ‘cohanim’[77]. 
Therefore in the last decade or so several proposals have been 
raised replacing the current exclusively religious marriage approach 
as an extreme one-track solution and establishing civil marriage and 
divorce for all who wish to marry [78]. 
Citation: Halmai G (2016) Constitutionalism, Law and Religion in Israel a State’s Multiple Identities. J Civil Legal Sci 5: 169. doi:10.4172/2169-
0170.1000169
Page 8 of 11
Volume 5 • Issue 1 • 1000169J Civil Legal Sci
ISSN: 2169-0170 JCLS, an open access journal
One of the proposals is another one-track approach, namely an 
exclusively civil marriage uniform for the entire population [79]. This 
proposal did not intend to prohibit religious marriage, but the civil 
validity of it would be contingent upon its civil registration by the 
state, in other words, it would not have independent validity. Also, the 
marriage in this approach could be dissolved only in a civil procedure, 
according to civil rules, regardless of the manner in which the marriage 
was conducted. The proposal intends to end the state sponsorship for 
rabbinical courts. 
Proposals had already been made in the mid-1990s to introduce 
civil marriage as a parallel track to religious marriage [80]. According 
to this proposal, it would be possible to choose a civil track in which 
marriage, adjudication, and divorce are entirely secular, but those 
choosing religious marriage would be subject to the existing Halakhic 
law and not allowed to seek a civil divorce. 
A mixed system proposal, with the emphasis of the civil marriage 
track, separates marriage and divorce. Marriage would be civilian, but 
rabbis would also receive a license to perform civil marriages, and all 
civil marriages would be subject to divorce in a religious court [81]. In 
the spirit of the parallel, but not equal tracks model the Israel Institute 
for Democracy proposed a civil union bill, according to which religious 
marriage would remain the official marriage, and those who chose it 
would be subject to the religious laws of divorce. But it would also 
be possible to choose the option of civil marriage, which contrary 
to the current legal situation, would be open to anyone who cannot 
or does not want to enter into a religious marriage. Those choosing 
civil marriage would sign a declaration stating that the person is not 
considered to be married according to the Halakha, and therefore will 
be able to divorce following a civil procedure [82]. 
Several years after the proposal of the Israel Institute for Democracy, 
its author, Shahar Lifsitz suggested a slightly revised compromise 
solution, which also emphasizes the importance of Halakhic as official 
marriage. In other words this approach preserves the existing situation, 
in which state law recognizes exclusively religious marriage, but 
introduces a new legal institution, referred to as civil union open to 
all who wish to use it. The state registration of the civil union would 
grant couples all the legal rights and obligations that civil laws in Israel 
provide to married couples. But, according to the proposal, instead of 
the religious divorce laws a newly established civil procedure would be 
applied to civil union registrants under civil court supervision. Lifsitz 
argues that politically the civil union proposal has the greatest chances 
of being enacted in the current Israeli situation. 
Palestinian-Arab millet system
Accommodating religious minorities on a group level, even to 
the extent of granting them full autonomy over family law matters, is 
generally considered to be liberal and tolerant in nature. Moreover, 
the beneficiary of liberalism and toleration in this context is the 
religious group rather than the individual. The model example for 
this was the ‘millet system’ of the Ottoman Empire, maintained by 
the British, where Muslims, Christians and Jews were all recognized 
as self-governing units (or ‘millets’) within the Empire [83]. But while 
the Ottomans accepted the principle of tolerance, they did not accept 
the quite separate principle of individual freedom of conscience, not 
tolerating individual dissent within the constituent communities. 
Therefore this was a distinct, non-liberal kind of toleration of group 
rights, which rather unites than separates church and state [84]. 
Discussing Israel’s Palestinian-Arab millet system, Michael 
Karayanni argues that, especially once a state such as Israel takes on a 
certain collective religious identity, making the entire state apparatus 
biased in favor of the majority religion, a sense of justice calls for this bias 
to be balanced by conceding some authority to the religious minority. 
In his view the notion that the accommodation granted to a religious 
minority is a balancing act is essentially what makes it seem liberal and 
tolerant. Karayanni goes to say that if, in Western democracies, a liberal 
stance holds a default position against the accommodation of religious 
groups, unless there is sufficient justification suggesting otherwise, the 
default position of liberalism and toleration in a religiously identified 
state is exactly the opposite: it favors the accommodation of minority 
religions unless strong justifications suggest not doing so. Studying 
the judicial autonomy granted to the Palestinian-Arab religious 
communities in Israel, Karayanni concludes that it is far from being an 
act of toleration and liberalism [85]. The major reason that influenced 
Israel’s policy of maintaining the Palestinian-Arab millets after 1948 
was its quest to gain international legitimacy, but since then they 
created a natural barrier to inter-marriage, thereby helping preserve 
Jewish identity. 
Conclusions
Israel as a religiously deeply divided society in recent years turns 
to religion to justify its claim to statehood. In response to persistent 
delegitimation, from within and without, the current government 
seems to support non-secular Zionism’s efforts to expand the role of 
religion in its political legitimation. This ‘religionization’ of Israeli 
Jewish society together with an ethnic division within the framework 
of a single territorial entity (due to the failure of the political leadership 
to reach a two-state territorial solution) leads to a Jewish nationalism, 
based in a collective identity rooted in religious foundations, which 
might well defeat ‘Israeliness’ as identity, as well the importance 
of democratic principles, including the rights of national and 
religious minorities [86]. The State of Israel from the beginning of its 
establishment embodied an equivocal mix of constitutive principles 
that cannot be resolved in favor of either liberal or illiberal elements 
[87], but the political aspirations of the Israeli government for more 
illiberal constitutionalism seems to be the decisive element to find 
similarly restrictive measures for freedom of religion. 
As regards the relationship of religious and state law seen in 
the example of the use of Halakhic law and Palestinian-Arab millet 
system regulating marriage and divorce, a liberal demand to establish 
exclusively civil marriage would most probably not be accepted by the 
majority of public. Not only religious but also partly secular Jews and 
Arabs would deny this approach and opt for religious marriage and 
divorce even if civil marriage were available. It would be difficult to find 
an overlapping consensus [88] in the matter between the arrangement 
based on liberal considerations and those based on religious-national 
ones. In this situation the state has to act positively to provide citizens 
with the ability to realize their autonomy to marry and divorce, but 
the liberal state also must use its authority, if necessary via civil courts 
to help spouses who cannot perceive themselves as divorced and 
cannot remarry without a religious ‘get’ realize their right to marriage 
and divorce. This approach is consistent with the views of the vast 
liberal literature developed dealing with the boundaries of autonomy 
that the liberal state should grant to a non-liberal minority group 
operating within its realm [89]. The same approach has been chosen 
by the High Court of Justice in the ‘Emanuel case’ [90], where an 
ultra-Orthodox school upon the request of one group of the parents 
separated the Ashkenazi and the Sephardic students. The High Court 
of Justice, representing liberal culture, declared the action of the school 
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on behalf of the illiberal Ashkenazi religious group as segregation 
and discrimination on ethnic grounds, and ordered that the action be 
abolished [91].
A parallel civil and religious marriage and divorce track solution 
would enable and even legitimize marriage between Jews and non-
Jews, and in addition to the traditional Jewish elements would support 
the Western-liberal cultural element of the State’s identity, together 
with ’Israeliness’ as a collective identity. The same applies to matters of 
the historical system of conversion, another part of personal law, which 
can also be maintained, not at the expense of but in conjunction with 
uniform civil systems of law [92]. In the case of the already mentioned 
new immigrants from the former Soviet Union the Special Conversion 
Courts, established by the state, but staffed by Orthodox Rabbis and 
following Orthodox practice, have been very slow in approving 
conversions and in particular have been rejecting many candidates for 
conversion on the basis of their alleged failure to commit to observing 
Jewish religious commandments. This strict interpretation of Orthodox 
Jewish religious rules was contrary to the official stance of the courts 
as published by the government at its website: a declaration of intent 
to observe Jewish religious commandments is sufficient. Because the 
Chief Rabbinate still uses restrictively control over the conversion 
process, and the current Netanyahu government decided to bury a 
recent initiative for conversion reforms, prominent rabbis formed an 
Alternative Conversion Court, which provides conversion to Judaism 
in a private ceremony. 
The same is true about the question of how the mentioned Sabbath 
work restrictions should be construed, whether they should be perceived 
and enforced as a day of rest or as a day of leisure. The controversy 
surrounding this issue, marriage, the conversion, and other issues 
touched upon above present another microcosm of religious-secular 
tensions and quest for identity in Israeli society, and another product 
of a Kulturkampf [93]. 
Israel, with its traditional values, a strong sense of community, and 
national interest, cannot be deemed as a liberal state forged entirely 
in Western mold [94], but it also cannot return to the pre-modern 
political conditions. Rather it has to move in the direction of ‘soft legal 
pluralism’ [95] controlled by the state. Of course, the hard question 
is: how much, and exactly which tradition, has to be acknowledged 
and integrated into the culture of the new society. In his recent 
book, Michael Walzer concludes that, although the total negation 
of exilic Judaism has failed, the secular Zionist modernizers should 
have sought a compromise with religion that would not provoke 
the counter-revolution a generation later. Walzer argues that some 
elements of this ‘traditionalist world views’ needed and still need to 
be negated: the fearfulness and passivity, the dominance of the rabbis, 
the subordination of women, and the role of the court Jew [6]. But, the 
secular modernists did compromise: by not taking away power over 
marriage and divorce from the religious authorities. The argument 
was done that this compromise was necessary, even though the 
religious fundamentalists never really accepted the supremacy of the 
secular state in the first place [96]. The view of Marxists critics that 
secular revolutionaries weren’t ‘absolutist’ enough was not shared 
[97]. My claim is that their compromise went too far, and contrary 
to Ben-Gurion’s expectations, the State of Israel lost control over its 
own religious establishment much more than countries with similarly 
established churches. Examples include Greece, where civil marriage 
exists, or even Malaysia, where there is civil marriage at least for non-
Muslims. Israel almost became a theocratic state for the sake of the 
religious freedom of (ultra)Orthodox Jews, who, as a political faction, 
do not exhibit appropriate respect for the rights of its non-Orthodox 
religious, non-religious Jewish, and non-Jewish citizens. 
In more general terms, Israel, after the repeated failures of the 
‘peace process’ and the two-state solution, faces very limited options. 
It either remains Jewish but ceases to be a democracy, or else it could 
become a genuinely multi-ethnic democracy, but would in that case 
cease to be ‘Jewish’ [98]. This choice became even more realistic after 
Likud won the March 17, 2015 elections, as Prime Minister Netanyahu 
declared that he will never permit a two state-solution between 
Israelis and Palestinians, adding: “Anyone who is going to establish 
a Palestinian state, anyone who is going to evacuate territories today, 
is simply giving a base for attacks to the radical Islam against Israel.” 
Even though two days after the election victory Netanyahu tried to 
backtrack from his declaration by saying that he only intended to argue 
that the two-state solution was impossible right now, the pre-election 
statement questions the commitment to his speech in June 2009 at Bar 
Ilan University, where he said: “In this small land of ours, two peoples 
live freely, side by side, in amity and mutual respect. Each will have 
its own flag, its own national anthem, its own government. Neither 
will threaten the security or survival of the other. We will be ready in 
a future peace agreement to reach a solution where a demilitarized 
Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish state [99].” But after the 
elections Netanyahu did not say he was ready to return to negotiations 
or to present any new plans for achieving peace [100]. One of the very 
likely consequences of Netanyahu’s victory for the near and the mid-
term future will be more hypernationalist, anti-democratic legislation, 
including the new basic law on Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish 
People [101]. As some argue, with his statement, Netanyahu made 
explicit the implicit beliefs and attitudes which are the real norms of 
Zionist, Jewish Israel, or, at the very least, of many of its citizens [102]. 
In other words, giving up the two-state solution, even if because ‘the 
reality has changed’ also ends any immediate hope for now for the 
position of liberal Zionism, which claims that Jews could have a state 
of their own, without depriving Palestinians of their legitimate national 
aspirations [103]. The one-state solution means that Israel will become, 
in time, either a non-Jewish democracy or Jewish non-democracy. 
Both of these perspectives are certainly against the will of the founders 
as well the very interest of the current population of the State of Israel. 
As regards the founders, Ben-Gurion was interviewed at length on 
Israeli state television in 1970, three years before his death. He said 
that order to reach peace Israel should relinquish all the territories 
conquered in 1967, apart from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: 
“[East] Jerusalem for history’s sake and the Golan for security…Peace 
is more important than real estate [104].” And this is the message of the 
Israeli writer, and member of the peace movement, Amos Oz regarding 
the state’s current interest. In his essay, Oz argues that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is neither a ‘religious war’, nor a ‘war of cultures’, 
but a mere ‘real estate dispute’, which is solvable [105]. Let us hope that 
both Ben-Gurion and Oz are right
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